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The impact of CHIP premium increases on
insurance outcomes among CHIP eligible children
Silviya Nikolova1* and Sally Stearns2
Abstract
Background: Within the United States, public insurance premiums are used both to discourage private health
policy holders from dropping coverage and to reduce state budget costs. Prior research suggests that the odds of
having private coverage and being uninsured increase with increases in public insurance premiums. The aim of this
paper is to test effects of Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) premium increases on public insurance,
private insurance, and uninsurance rates.
Methods: The fact that families just below and above a state-specific income cut-off are likely very similar in terms
of observable and unobservable characteristics except the premium contribution provides a natural experiment
for estimating the effect of premium increases. Using 2003 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) merged with
CHIP premiums, we compare health insurance outcomes for CHIP eligible children as of January 2003 in states
with a two-tier premium structure using a cross-sectional regression discontinuity methodology. We use
difference-in-differences analysis to compare longitudinal insurance outcomes by December 2003.
Results: Higher CHIP premiums are associated with higher likelihood of private insurance. Disenrollment from CHIP
in response to premium increases over time does not increase the uninsurance rate.
Conclusions: When faced with higher CHIP premiums, private health insurance may be a preferable alternative for
CHIP eligible families with higher incomes. Therefore, competition in the insurance exchanges being formed under
the Affordable Care Act could enhance choice.
Keywords: Health insurance, Premium, Health care reform
Background
The Children Health Insurance Program (CHIP) in the
Unites States was created by the Balanced Budget Act of
1997 to help expand health insurance coverage to children
in families with incomes which are too high to qualify for
Medicaid, the public insurance program for individuals
with low incomes. Although partly funded by the federal
government, CHIP is administered by the states. States
have flexibility in designing their cost-sharing and plan
benefits structure, as well as in eligibility and enrollment
provisions, subject to federal requirements. Most CHIP
programs charge premiums to families based on income.
Public insurance premiums both discourage private
health policy holders from dropping coverage and reduce
state budget costs. Previous studies examined the effect of
higher public insurance premium on public enrollment,
private enrollment, and uninsurance rates [1,2]. The stud-
ies showed that the odds of having private coverage and
being uninsured both increased with premium increases.
Three other assessments showed that many children leav-
ing state CHIP coverage lost any form of insurance [3-5].
Other studies documented a drop in health insurance
coverage in response to rising premiums using different
data sets [6-8].
Premium contributions for CHIP are influenced by the
perceptions of legislators, the level of premium contribu-
tion required for public premium schedules in other
states, the political context in which they were introduced,
and the decisions by individuals regarding insurance pur-
chase [9]. These considerations may have important bear-
ing on the impacts of initial premium levels as well as
premium increases over time [5]. The evaluation of pre-
mium effects on insurance purchase also must address
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selection in “enrollment” choice. Children with public or
private health insurance may be different in terms of their
family income, health, or preferences from children who
are not insured [10].
We contribute to the existing literature by using a differ-
ent research design (regression discontinuity (RD)) and a
natural experiment due to the fact that children just below
and above a state income cut-off are likely very similar in
terms of observable and unobservable characteristics ex-
cept the premium contribution, with children in families
above the income cut-off having a higher premium. We
used this jump in premium rate to evaluate the impact of
CHIP premium on insurance outcomes using a regression
discontinuity approach applied to the 2003 panel of the
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) linked to pre-
mium and eligibility data at the state level.
Up until 2003, states rarely imposed cost sharing in
their CHIP programs [11], but budgetary difficulties re-
versed this pattern when eleven states increased their
premiums in 2003; in addition, one state imposed new
cost sharing on the poorest families which did not have
to pay such premiums before. We exploited the cross-
sectional and temporal variation in premiums in 2003
to study the relationship between CHIP premiums and
insurance outcomes.
Methods
Analytical methods
This paper measures the effect of variation in premium
across individuals, states, and over time on insurance
coverage. The cut-off rule for assigning CHIP eligible chil-
dren to premium groups varies across states. We use “pre-
mium group” to denote a group of families with children
who, based on state-specific income and age eligibility
rules, fall into a CHIP premium bracket. We evaluate en-
rollment in the lowest two premium groups because of
the small number of observations in higher premium
groups. The income cut-off between premium groups is
based on percentage of the federal poverty line (FPL) and
varies across states to reflect local cost of living and
budget availability. However, in every state with a two tier
premium structure, the underlying principle is the same:
for a given child age, families with family income I below a
state specific income cut-off pay a smaller CHIP premium
compared to families with income at or above the cut-off.
Thus, the premium payment, as a function of I, contains a
jump at the income cut-off between the premium groups.
This discontinuity in premium payments fits within the
conceptual framework of the Regression Discontinuity
design. The method assumes threshold randomization,
implying that, within small vicinity around the cut-off,
children in the low and high premium groups near the
cut-off are the same in terms of all observable and unob-
servable characteristics except the premium payment. The
RD method has been shown to identify mean treatment
effects for a subgroup of the population without having to
rely on arbitrary assumptions about functional form and
exclusion restrictions [12].
Since MEPS (described in the next section) is designed
to produce nationally representative estimates, we first
evaluate data on all states with a two tier premium struc-
ture as of January 2003. Premium level Pi varies across
premium groups within a state and across states. The
cross-sectional RD equation is defined as:
yis ¼
X
s∈S
αsDs þ β0 þ βp P
s
i
 
1 I i≥I
s 
þ g I i;I
s 
þ uis; i∈ℑ
s
where yis is the insurance enrollment outcome for child i
in state s. S* is the group of states with two premium
groups. 1 I i≥I
s 
is an indicator function denoting assign-
ment of child i to the high premium group in state s. ℑs
denotes the subsample included in the estimation such
that I
s
−h < I i < I
s
þ h where h is the interval around the
cut-off. The coefficient on the high premium group indi-
cator is of primary interest and is defined as: β0 þ βpP
s
i .
This linear function captures the change in insurance sta-
tus in response to premium change. The parameter β0
captures the average enrollment for children above the in-
come threshold level, and βp is the linear effect of the pre-
mium on the likelihood a child is insured. We control for
state-specific fixed effects with a set of dummies Ds. The
state dummies allow low premium groups to be different
across states, while the high premium groups can differ
only in β0 þ βp P
s
i
 
. Since income I is the only systematic
determinant of the premium fee and income influences in-
surance choice [13,14], the inclusion of a smooth function
g I i;I
s 
which is continuous at the state income cut-off I
s
solves the endogeneity issue [12]. Thus, after controlling
for differences in premium and income and for state-
specific fixed effects, we presume no other factors affect
the insurance outcomes of children. We therefore estimate
a “sharp” RD model since the “simulated” insurance status
is a deterministic function of family income.
We apply a Difference-in-Differences (DD) method to
states with a two tier premium structure as of December
2003 to evaluate the impact of premium increases over
time:
yist ¼
X
s∈S
αsDs þ β0 þ β1 P
s
it
 
1 I it≥I
s
t
 
þ γ0 þ γ1 P
s
it
 
t þ δ0 þ δ1 P
s
it
 
t1 I it≥I
s
t
  
þ β
0
zzist þ uist ; i∈ℑ
s
where S** is the relevant group of states. yist is the insur-
ance enrollment status of child i in state s at time t. ℑs is
the subsample included in the estimation. The state dum-
mies (Ds) control for state heterogeneity. Premium, time
and premium-time interactions are modelled as linear
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specifications. The set of premium variables β1, γ1 and
δ1 capture the linear premium effect for being in the
high premium group, for being in the second period,
and their interaction. The variables β0, γ0 and δ0 cap-
ture, respectively, the average enrollment for the high
premium groups, in the post premium increase period,
and for high premium groups in the second period. z is
a set of other variables that affect insurance status.
We provide summary statistics on child age and health
for the groups above and below the income cut-off and
compare their means using data on the largest state in
our data set to evaluate whether RD design is appropri-
ate for the purposes of our study.
Data
The data for the analysis come from the 2003 MEPS
panel. MEPS is designed to produce nationally repre-
sentative estimates for insurance coverage, medical ex-
penditure, and health care use. It provides detailed
data on a wide range of health, demographic, and so-
cioeconomic characteristics [15]. We collected data on
CHIP premiums and eligibility from program websites
for all states and the District of Columbia. The pre-
mium data were merged by state to the 2003 full-year
consolidated MEPS files. Ethical approval has been ob-
tained from the Institutional Review Board (study
number 05–0944 at the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill).
As of January 2003, 18 CHIP programs with at least a
two tier premium structure charged families up to $61
per child per month if in the low premium group and
up to $77 if in the high premium group. Eleven states in-
creased premiums over the course of 2003. By December
2003, an additional state adopted a two-tier premium
structure, so these 19 states are used in the longitudinal
DD analysis.
Each state’s premium information is used to assign the
premium amount that the family unit will face to cover
one child for one month. We have not included in our
analysis states that charge annual premiums as we seek
to evaluate the impact of monthly CHIP premium con-
tributions on insurance status. The longitudinal sample
is further constricted to include only children who had
positive full year weights for 2003 and participated in
MEPS for the entire year. We evaluate January enroll-
ment outcomes for CHIP eligible children in the cross-
sectional analysis. For our longitudinal analysis, we focus
on January and December. In addition to premium, we
control for family income, health and age of the child
which are obtained from MEPS. Health is verified by
asking parents whether the child gets sick easily, with
higher scores pointing to better child health. Child age is
measured as of the end of 2003.
Assigning program eligibility and insurance status
The analysis relies on CHIP eligibility simulation that pre-
dicts the eligibility status of each child in each state using
information on family income, family structure, child age,
and state-specific eligibility rules as they would be applied
to new applicants. If a child is assigned CHIP eligibility
and is observed in the data to have public insurance, CHIP
insurance status is assigned. A CHIP eligible child ob-
served in the data to hold private health insurance is
assigned private insurance status. Uninsurance status is
assigned if a CHIP-eligible child is not recorded to have
public or private insurance coverage. Since CHIP eligibility
is determined on monthly basis, the data incorporate the
possibility of a change in insurance status due to changes
in state eligibility rules and/or premium payments and/or
child age. An online Additional file 1 provides details of
the assignment.
Results
Summary statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for children in low
and high premium groups in 18 states with a two tier pre-
mium structure as of January 2003. Children in the first
income group are, on average, slightly older than children
in the second group. Family income, by construction, in-
creases with premium group. CHIP enrollment is lower,
private insurance take-up is higher, and the uninsurance
rate is lower among children in the high versus low pre-
mium group.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for children in low
premium and high premium groups in 19 states with a
two-tier premium structure as of January 2003 and
December 2003. For both premium groups, average family
Table 1 Summary statistics – cross-sectional data
Mean St.d.
Low premium group (n = 587) Insurance
CHIP 0.52 0.5
Private 0.269 0.444
Uninsured 0.213 0.41
Income (% FPL) 126.2 14.88
Premium 5.02 5.52
Child age 10.97 4.36
High premium group (n = 1,044) Insurance
CHIP 0.303 0.4
Private 0.576 0.494
Uninsured 0.122 0.327
Income (%FPL) 189.9 26.52
Premium 12.66 10.31
Child age 9.82 5.1
Characteristics for children in low premium and high premium groups in 18
states with a two tier premium structure, January 2003.
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income, child age and health remain relatively constant
over the course of the year, and average premium in-
creases. Unadjusted rates for public and private insurance
and uninsurance remain similar over 2003.
Cross-sectional analysis
Table 3 shows the cross-sectional RD estimates for the
association between CHIP premium and insurance
coverage. The results indicate that a $1 increase in the
premium above the income cut-off is associated with a
higher probability of being privately insured in the
range of 2.2 to 1.7 percentage points (p < 0.05) for band-
widths of ±15% to ±25% of the Federal Poverty Level,
respectively. Estimates for associations with public in-
surance and uninsurance status are not statistically sig-
nificant. These findings suggest that child coverage
through private insurance may become a preferable al-
ternative for CHIP families in the higher income group
when faced with higher CHIP premiums [16]. A test of
the joint significance of the state-specific dummies
shows statistically significant heterogeneity among the
low premium groups across states in terms of insurance
enrollment status. Additionally, a test of income signifi-
cance shows that, when observations are close to the
state-specific cut-off, family income does not have a sta-
tistically significant impact on the probability of public
insurance, private insurance or uninsurance. This indi-
cates that changes in these probabilities are captured by
the other covariates in the regressions.
Longitudinal analysis
The first set of columns in Table 4 shows the difference-
in-differences estimates for the impact of CHIP premium
increases during 2003 on insurance coverage among CHIP
eligible children. Our findings suggest that a $1 variation
in increases in CHIP premiums over time are associated
with a statistically significant increases in disenrollment
from CHIP (range of 1.4 to 2.1 percentage points) and in
private insurance take-up (range of 1.1 to 2.2 percentage
points), but that CHIP premium increases have no effect
Table 2 Summary statistics – longitudinal data
January December
Mean St.d. N Mean St.d. N
Low premium group CHIP 0.423 0.494 926 0.42 0.494 932
Private 0.367 0.482 0.368 0.483
No insurance 0.217 0.412 0.216 0.411
Income (% FPL) 142.75 43.27 143.03 43.35
Premium ($) 4.99 7.17 5.88 7.16
Child age 10.16 4.63 10.15 4.65
Health state* 3.49 1.64 3.48 1.65
High premium group CHIP 0.33 0.47 604 0.32 0.47 598
Private 0.575 0.495 0.577 0.494
No insurance 0.101 0.302 0.1 0.301
Income (% FPL) 191.94 27.91 192.29 27.83
Premium($) 10.55 7.13 11.53 7.53
Child age 9.88 4.99 9.84 4.98
Health state* 3.47 1.69 3.46 1.7
(*) - Health status is taken by the question whether the child gets sick easily where 1 stands for definitely true and 5 is for definitely not.
Characteristics for children in low premium and high premium groups in 19 states with a two tier premium structure, January and December, 2003.
Table 3 Cross-sectional regression discontinuity estimates of a $1 increase in CHIP premium for three bandwidths
presented as % of FPL using data on 18 states
% CHIP Private Uninsurance Number of children above and below cut-off
−15/+15 −0.014 0.022* −0.008 212/167
(.011) (.010) (.009)
−20/+20 −0.009 0.018* −0.009 256/191
(.009) (.009) (.008)
−25/+25 −0.007 0.017* −0.010 317/230
(.008) (.008) (.006)
(*) - indicates significance at the 5 per cent confidence level.
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on uninsurance across the bandwidths considered. The sec-
ond set of columns reports the high premium group
dummy estimates from the difference-in-differences esti-
mation for different insurance types. These estimates show
that children in the high premium group are statistically
significantly more likely to be privately insured as well as
statistically significantly less likely to be uninsured. Time in-
variant characteristics of the high premium group such as
access to private insurance options and/or cost of these al-
ternatives in terms of monetary (other than premium) and
non-monetary dimensions can explain the higher probabil-
ity of private insurance and lower probability of uninsur-
ance. The remaining columns in Table 4 report the time
dummy estimates. The time dummy captures the change in
insurance coverage in response to time-varying factors that
are not explicitly controlled for but are constant across
states. In all three regressions, we find small and mostly sta-
tistically insignificant results for the time dummy, suggest-
ing that other time-varying covariates have not contributed
to the change in insurance status of CHIP eligible children
in 2003. A joint test of income significance reveals that in-
come is not a statistically significant determinant of the
probability of CHIP coverage, private coverage, or uninsur-
ance when children with family income near the state in-
come cut-off are considered. A joint test of the statistical
importance of state dummies shows that state specific fac-
tors are associated with the likelihood of public insurance
and private insurance, but not uninsurance.
Testing of assumptions
We test the RD assumption that children just below and
just above a state-specific income cut-off are similar in
all observable and unobservable characteristics except
the premium contribution. Table 5 shows the mean age
and health of children in the largest state in our data set.
The differences between the means are small. Results
from a t-test show no statistically significant difference
between the means from the two samples. This null
finding suggests that the observed change in insurance
enrollment at the cut-off is likely to be related to the
jump in premium, and not to child age and health, even
though previous literature has shown that insurance
coverage is associated with child age and health [10].
Discussion
Prior evidence suggests that CHIP premium increases
increase both the likelihood of being privately insured or
uninsured; given this prior evidence, researchers have ar-
gued that premium schedules should be designed to pre-
serve the accessibility of public insurance and prevent
private insurance crowd-out [1,2,5,10]. This analysis
adds to the existing literature by using a different re-
search design (regression discontinuity) and a natural
experiment due to the fact that children just below and
above the cut-off are likely very similar in terms of ob-
servable and unobservable characteristics except the pre-
mium contribution. Specifically, we used data from 19
states and took advantage of a unique feature of the
CHIP program which creates a discontinuity in pre-
mium, with families with income above a state-specific
cut-off paying more for CHIP public insurance for their
child. The cross-sectional analysis showed that a $1 in-
crease in premium above the cut-off is associated with
an increase in the probability of private insurance in the
Table 4 Difference-in-differences estimates for three different bandwidths presented as % of FPL using data on 19 states
% Premium jump of $1 High premium group dummy Time dummy Number of children above
and below the cut-off
CHIP Private Uninsurance CHIP Private Uninsurance CHIP Private Uninsurance
−15/+15 −0.021* 0.022* −0.004 0.028 0.240* −0.331* −0.063 −0.009 0.080 166/164
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.089) (.080) (.082) (.046) (.042) (.042)
−20/+20 −0.019* 0.016* 0.000 0.032 0.107 −0.202* −0.030 −0.012 0.055 192/210
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.076) (.070) (.066) (.042) (.039) (.037)
−25/+25 −0.014* 0.011* −0.001 0.005 0.189* −0.232* −0.064 −0.017 0.086* 230/250
(.004) (.003) (.003) (.072) (.062) (.061) (.040) (.035) (.034)
(*) - indicates significance at the 5 per cent confidence level.
Table 5 Summary statistics for age and health for the
largest state
Bandwidth Group Number of chidlren Age Health
15 Low premium 88 9.227 3.648
(5.13) (1.576)
High premium 109 9.364 3.618
(5.037) (1.49)
20 Low premium 98 9.143 3.755
(5.007) (1.554)
High premium 130 9.331 3.654
(4.937) (1.418)
25 Low premium 130 9.1 3.746
(5.031) (1.464)
High premium 150 9.367 3.627
(4.966) (1.44)
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range of 1.7 to 2.2 percentage points for children with
higher family income but had no impact on public in-
surance or uninsurance. The difference-in-differences
results point to an increase in the probability of private
insurance in between 1.1 and 2.2 percentage points and
to a decline in the probability of CHIP enrollment in
the range of 1.4 to 2.1 percentage points in response to
premium increases of $1 over time. Neither analysis
showed increases in the rate of uninsurance. These findings
suggest that for CHIP eligible families with higher incomes,
child coverage through private insurance may become a
preferable alternative when faced with higher CHIP pre-
miums. The results also underscore the importance to
these families of keeping their children insured.
A potential limitation of our study is that we do not take
into account the total premium spending at the family
level or the caps on these payments imposed in some
states. Premium costs for all children, as opposed to one
child, represent a more sizeable share of family income,
and insurance coverage decisions are likely made at the
family level. Another limitation is that CHIP eligibility and
insurance coverage are not directly observed and, there-
fore, must be imputed. Measurement error can result
because the assignment procedure fails to completely rep-
licate the “true” process or simply because income infor-
mation has been misreported.
Conclusion
The relationships identified in this analysis, especially the
longitudinal estimates, are potentially informative regard-
ing the effects of premium increases for CHIP. The results
may also be relevant for state health insurance exchanges
as the provisions of the Affordable Care Act are imple-
mented. Increases in public insurance premiums can cause
families to switch to private insurance options, such as
plans that will be available through state health insurance
exchanges. The ability of exchanges to offer insurance at
competitive prices can enhance both choice and efficiency
in insurance plan selection. Yet even in the face of CHIP
premium increases, families do not seem to switch to a
state of uninsurance, at least in the group of families
eligible for CHIP.
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